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Abstract:  
This paper attempts to quantify the private and public economic value of reducing 
obesity through pharmaceutical and medical interventions. We find that the economic 
value of such treatments, in particular bariatric surgery, is large for treated patients, with 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios typically under $20,000 per life-year saved. Our 
approach accounts for competing risks to life expectancy, health care cost savings, and 
other non-medical fiscal consequences. Most of the therapeutic value is generated by 
longer healthy life expectancy, with modest contributions from health spending, taxes 
and other spending. Obesity treatment generates substantial per-period savings in 
medical costs, but it also raises lifetime medical and annuity costs by extending life. On 
balance, treatment generates substantial private economic value and lowers the 
prevalence of obesity, but the aggregate fiscal effects on the public-sector are small. 
 
Keywords: Obesity, health spending, ageing, microsimulation 
 
JEL Classification: I10, I38, J26 
 
 2 
 
A. Introduction 
 
While the prevalence of smoking in cohorts approaching retirement has decreased over 
the last 30 years, obesity has more than doubled over the same period. In spite of their 
very different effects on health and life expectancy, both these trends may have forced 
Americans to dig deeper into the public purse.  Goldman et al. (2010) found obesity to be 
expensive from a public finance perspective, because it substantially raises morbidity but 
only modestly decreases longevity.  Smoking, on the other hand, may have led to fiscal 
savings, because it reduces longevity by substantially more than it raises morbidity. Some 
research has indeed confirmed that this may be the case (Barendregt et al., 1997).  
 Interventions to reduce smoking have succeeded to some extent. Evidence points 
to the role of taxes, smoking bans and advertising in decreasing tobacco consumption 
(Chaloupka and Warner, 2000). Behavioral interventions to reduce obesity have met with 
more resistance and skepticism. Over the twentieth-century, population-wide gains in 
weight have occurred because of declining physical activity and rising calorie intake 
(Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2009; Cutler, Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003).  Modifying 
physical activity patterns is quite difficult.  Targeting unhealthy food consumption may 
help, but high calorie (or fat) substitutes may exist which may dampen effective change 
in calorie intake (Chouinard et al., 2007).  
On the other hand, recent medical innovations have made it possible to surgically 
alter calorie needs by constricting the stomach. Laparoscopic gastric bypass and 
adjustable gastric banding are two of the most common bariatric procedures. Such 
procedures are becoming less invasive for the patient. In 2005, 170,000 Americans 
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received this treatment (Cremieux et al., 2008), which is currently reserved for those with 
BMI over 40, or over 35 with other co-morbidities.  Current evidence points to a 20% 
reduction in BMI for those treated with surgery, and the effects persist up to 10 years 
after surgery. Results from pharmacotherapy are also encouraging. For example, 
sibutramine has been found to reduce weight and the prevalence of hypertension and 
diabetes (James et al., 2000; O’Meara et al., 2002). Other prescribed drugs include 
orlistat and rimonabant.  
To our knowledge, few studies have looked at the economic value of such 
interventions, including the long-term effects on health, medical costs, and other 
government programs. The existing literature has focused its attention on the private 
benefits and costs to an employer (or insurer) that covers bariatric surgery. Finkelstein 
and Brown (2005) estimated annual health care costs attributable to obesity and 
compared those to the cost of the surgery and of work days lost. They calculate that it 
takes an average of 5 to 10 years before an insurer or employer would recoup its private 
costs. Similarly, Crémieux et al. (2008) conducted a similar analysis on a sample of 
patients who were followed before and after surgery. They estimate much larger benefits, 
and consequently a shorter cost-recovery period, of less than 3 years.  A review of cost-
effectiveness by Picot et al. (2009) reveals acceptable cost-effectivness ratios of lifetime 
medical expenditures avoided divided by incremental QALYs gained.  
Although they clearly demonstrate the potential for health cost savings, these studies 
exclude important long-term impacts on health care costs and life expectancy, as well as 
financial effects outside the health care sector. First, most studies follow health care costs 
for only three years or less following the surgery. This excludes the long-term cost-
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savings that may be enjoyed, for example, by the Medicare program.  An exception is 
Craig and Tseng (2002), who extrapolate lifetime cost savings from published data on 
lifetime medical costs attributable to obesity (Thomson et al., 2010). While useful, this 
extrapolation is limited by its substantial reliance on two data points – lifetime spending 
for patients with BMI of 32 and 37.5, respectively -- while the BMI of patients treated 
with bariatric surgery often exceeds 40. Similar issues arise with the analysis of life 
expectancy.  Most studies focus on the direct effects, but do not take a long-run 
perspective, which would consider competing risks, reinforcing co-morbid conditions, 
and other aspects of health dynamics.  Finally, little is known about the effects on wages, 
taxes, productivity, and annuity burdens for the public-sector.   
To address these diverse gaps in the literature, we rely on the Future Elderly Model 
(FEM), an established and well-studied microsimulation model of aging and health.  The 
FEM permits forecasts of differences in health and economic trajectories for individuals 
with different baseline health characteristics and health interventions.  We combine the 
machinery of the FEM with current estimates on the long-term effectiveness of surgical 
and pharmaceutical treatments to estimate long-term impacts on: longevity; competing 
comorbidities; health care costs (private, Medicare and Medicaid); tax revenue; and 
Social Security expenditures (disability and old-age pensions). We assess the sensitivity 
of all our estimates to a range of assumptions about the effectiveness of each 
intervention. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section B provides an overview of the model and 
the assumptions used regarding the effectiveness of the interventions. Section C presents 
results for the eligible population under various scenarios. In section D, we ask what 
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long-term aggregate effects we would observe if a policy was implemented that mandated 
(or strongly encouraged) the intervention on the eligible population. We compare 
outcomes under such scenarios to the status-quo scenario using projected trends in 
obesity based on current younger cohorts. Finally, we discuss the implications of our 
results in section E. 
B. Methods 
Here, we describe both the FEM, which is the underlying engine for our results, as well 
as the way in which obesity interventions are incorporated. 
B.1 The Future Elderly Model 
The Future Elderly Model was developed to forecast long-term health and health care 
costs under different scenarios for medical technology development and utilization 
(Goldman et al., 2004). Its unique feature is to follow, in a microsimulation framework, 
the evolution of individual-level health trajectories, rather than the average or aggregate 
health characteristics of a cohort.  It has been used for a number of purposes, including 
estimating the value of new medical technologies and treatments (Goldman et al., 2005) 
and estimating the value of prevention (Goldman et al., 2009). It covers the age 50+ 
population, using data from the Health and Retirement Study. The current version of the 
model includes a number of non-health outcomes, including:  retirement, earnings, 
savings, tax payments, and participation in public programs like Social Security and 
Disability Insurance.  This facilitates analysis of implications for a broad range of 
markets and institutions.   As shown in Goldman et al. (2010), better health usually 
implies higher Social Security expenditures and tax revenues, which impact the fiscal 
impacts of various health scenarios.  
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The model has three core components. The first predicts trajectories for health 
and economic outcomes.  Taking as an input a cohort of individuals with particular 
baseline health and economic characteristics, this component predicts the likely evolution 
of health and economic outcomes, at the individual-level.  Technically, it consists of 21 
nonlinear transition equations from a period t state to a period t+1 state. Each equation 
depends upon fixed socio-demographic covariates (race, education, and gender), in 
addition to the health and economic state variables in the model. Three set of outcomes or 
states appear. The first group consists of health measures, including:  health indicators for 
physician-diagnosed diseases; activities of daily living (ADL) limitations; and risk factors 
such as smoking and BMI. For example, log BMI at time t+1 is modeled as a function of 
lagged log BMI and other covariates at time t. Or, the rate of incidence of diabetes at year 
t+1 is a function of health conditions already diagnosed at t, including hypertension, BMI 
and heart disease. Estimation of the relevant transition probabilities is done using 
longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Study (1992-2004).  
The second group of outcomes consists of economic variables, including:  
earnings, household wealth, labor force status, disability benefit status, and social 
security claiming status. These transition probabilities are also estimated on HRS data. 
The last group of outcomes consists of nursing home entry – a major predictor of health 
costs – and mortality. Both of these hazards are also estimated from HRS data.  
Three important assumptions are maintained in the estimation. The first is that 
economic transitions do not affect health transitions. There is little evidence in panel data 
that changes in economic circumstances affect health (Adams et al., 2003; Smith, 2007; 
Michaud and van Soest, 2008). However, we do allow for baseline economic 
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circumstances at age 50 to affect health trajectories. Second, for reasons of parsimony, 
we embed expert clinical knowledge about health transitions into the model (Goldman et 
al., 2004). For example, we allow for causal effects of one health state on another only 
when there is a clear causal link established in the clinical literature – e.g., the 
demonstrated effect of hypertension on heart disease. Unsubstantiated causal effects – 
e.g., of cancer on hypertension – are assumed to be zero by construction.  We tested 
sensitivity to this approach, and found that relaxing these restrictions altered the 
parameter estimates somewhat, but they did not significantly alter long-term predictions 
for the scenarios we considered. In the appendix, we give more detail on the estimation of 
our transition rates and provide statistical justifications for our assumptions.  
BMI is considered a risk factor for diabetes, heart disease, stroke and 
hypertension. We use a spline in log BMI with a knot at a BMI of 30 units. The spline 
above log(30) captures excess BMI in percentage terms. We omit the spline variable 
below 30, because there is virtually no effect of BMI on disease incidence between the 
values of 25 and 30, but large positive effects below 25. We do not allow the obesity 
interventions to target groups with BMI below 25. Our estimation results show that for 
those with a BMI over 30, a 25% increase in weight increases the incidence rate of 
diabetes by 1.7 percentage points, the incidence rate of heart disease by 0.9 percentage 
points, and the probability of having any ADL limitations by 5.2% percentage points. 
These numbers encompass only the direct effect; the total effect in the dynamic model is 
more complex – e.g., diabetes affects the incidence of heart disease, which then affects 
the incidence of ADL limitations, and so on. 
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The second component is a policy module that transforms health and economic 
outcomes into public expenditures and revenues, using tax and expenditure calculators. 
The “medical expenditure calculator” predicts expected Medicare, Medicaid and other 
private medical expenditures, given a set of health, economic, and demographic states 
and characteristics. The predictions are based on data from the Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey (MEPS) prior to age 65, and the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 
(MCBS) after age 65. We run regressions of total expenditures on health outcomes 
(physician-diagnosed diseases, ADLs), demographics (age, gender, race and education), 
and nursing home status. Details on those regressions are provided in the appendix. The 
model also includes calculators for tax revenue, and Social Security Old-Age and 
Disability benefits; all these have been validated against administrative totals for these 
programs. 
A third component of the model is used to “refresh” the cohorts used in the model.  
Specifically, this draws in a new cohort of 50 year-olds for every year, as the simulation 
progresses forward. Through manipulation of this cohort’s characteristics, this “refresh” 
process allows for the incorporation of trends in health, socio-demographic and economic 
outcomes. For example, we can consider the effects of falling smoking by gradually 
decreasing the prevalence of smoking in the incoming cohorts.  Long-term forecasting is 
known to be imprecise, and important assumptions are made concerning these trends in 
the 50 year-old cohort’s characteristics, so as to provide credible long-term forecasts. We 
discuss these assumptions further in Section D, when we implement long-term scenarios 
for the interventions we consider.  
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A complete technical appendix containing details on the modeling is available 
online at the Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics website 
(http://healthpolicy.usc.edu/)  
 
B.2 Medical and Pharmaceutical Interventions Considered 
We focus our attention on two interventions: a) bariatric surgery (gastric bypass) 
and b) pharmacotherapy for obesity. We discuss each in turn and focus on describing the 
treatment itself, its eligibility criteria, its effectiveness in controlling weight, and its direct 
cost. According to current guidelines, the first-line treatment for obesity is weight 
management through exercise and reduced calorie intake. If first-line treatment fails, 
pharmacotherapy and bariatric surgery may be prescribed, based on weight status and the 
presence of co-morbidities.  
Individuals are classified as obese if their BMI exceeds 30. Within this group, class 
1 obesity refers to those with a BMI between 30 and 34.9, class 2 to those with a BMI 
between 35 and 39.9, and finally class 3 (or morbid) obesity to those who have a BMI 
over 40. The co-morbidities most often considered are hypertension, diabetes and heart 
disease/stroke (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2001).    
 
B.2.1 Bariatric Surgery 
There are various ways in which surgery may be used to induce weight loss. The 
most common procedure entails a “gastric bypass,” which consists of partitioning the 
upper part of the stomach in order to create a pouch connected to the intestine directly. 
The procedure, which is commonly done laparoscopically (through a small incision in the 
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abdomen), usually requires 3 to 5 days of inpatient stay, and the actual operation lasts 
less than an hour (Dixon et al., 2008). Other common procedures include adjustable 
gastric banding, which constricts the top of the stomach so as to reduce its size. This last 
procedure is becoming less popular, partly because 10 to 30% of cases may require re-
operation (Dixon et al., 2008). Other procedures such as vertical banded gastroplastry are 
used less frequently nowadays. Our focus will be on gastric bypass.  
Patients with BMI over 40, or BMI over 35 with high-risk comorbidities are the 
target population for surgery as second-line treatment (Picot et al., 2009). Picot et al. 
(2009) reported on a meta-analysis of such treatments and conclude that gastric bypass 
surgery reduces weight up to 25% on average, with effects varying according to the target 
population. In particular, one cohort study (Sjostrom et al., 2004) suggests that these 
effects are close to permanent with weight loss 17% larger after 10 years. Cremieux et al. 
(2008) report that the average cost of the procedure in the month of performance ranges 
from $17,000 for laparoscopic gastric bypass to $26,000 for open bypass surgery.   These 
serve as our baseline efficacy and cost impact parameters. 
 
B.2.2 Pharmacotherapy 
Three drugs are currently prescribed for the long-term treatment of obesity: 
orlistat, subutramine and rimonabant. In a review of clinical trials, Rucker et al. (2007) 
concluded that almost all studies reported weight loss up to four years after starting 
treatment. The average BMI in these clinical trials was 35, and some trials focused on 
populations with particular pre-existing conditions (e.g. diabetes).  The average effect on 
weight relative to placebo ranged from 3% (orlistat) to 4.5% (sibutramine). In the control 
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group, average weight loss ranged from 1% to 2% of pre-intervention weight. Hence, the 
average effect ranges between 4% and 6.5% of baseline weight.  
In most studies following patients over time, effects appeared to be maintained up 
to four years after starting the treatment. Considerable differences in methodology and 
eligible population led to some heterogeneity in these results. Effects appeared larger in 
populations with higher weight and pre-existing conditions (such as diabetes). Adverse 
effects vary across the drugs. Some patients taking Orlistat had adverse effects in terms 
of gastrointestinal problems (7-20%). This led to attrition in some trials. On the other 
hand, patients taking subutramine had on average higher blood pressure (1.7 mm Hg 
systolic and 2.4 mm Hg diastolic) and pulse rate (4.5 beats per minute). Finally, the main 
side effect for those taking rimonabant was an elevated risk of psychiatric disorders (2 to 
5% more likely than placebo). Average annual cost for treatment is roughly $400, when 
averaging across branded ($1500) and generic ($90) (Rucker et al., 2007). 
 
C. Eligible Population Scenarios 
C.1 Scenarios 
C.1.1 Bariatric Surgery 
 
For our baseline analysis, we define eligibility for the surgery based on two 
characteristics: BMI, and the presence of relevant co-morbidities. In particular, we 
consider the presence of diabetes, heart disease, hypertension or ADL limitations, as 
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comorbidities which grant eligibility to those with a BMI between 35 and 40 (Picot et al, 
2009). 
For bariatric surgery, we will consider two eligibility criteria: 
a) Current Eligibility: those with BMI over 40, or BMI between 35 and 40 
with co-morbidities. This follows current medical guidelines.  
b) Extended Eligibility: those with BMI over 35 or those with BMI between 
30 and 35 with co-morbidities. Compared with the current eligibility 
scenario, this extends eligibility to those with BMI between 35 and 40 
without pre-existing conditions, and to those with BMI between 30 and 35 
and pre-existing conditions. 
According to these criteria, there are 1.26 million individuals aged 50 eligible for 
the surgery under the current eligibility criteria, and 2.66 million under the extended 
eligibility criteria.  
In our baseline scenarios, we apply a 25% weight loss to those who get the 
surgery, based on the evidence discussed above. We consider that loss to be permanent. 
However, in sensitivity analysis, we consider a scenario where patients regain 50% of the 
lost weight after 10 years.  We also consider sensitivity analysis where the surgery has an 
effectiveness of 15% and 35% rather than the 25% assumed in the baseline. 
C.1.2 Pharmacotherapy 
We use different eligibility criteria for pharmacotherapy, because there is no official 
guideline for prescribing these drugs. However, their effectiveness has been demonstrated 
for individuals with an average BMI of 35 or greater. Hence, we use the following two 
eligibility criteria: 
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a) Current Eligibility: eligibility is defined as having a BMI between 35 and 
40, or a BMI of 30 to 35 with comorbidities. 
b) Extended Eligibility: eligibility is extended to those with BMI between 
30 and 35 without comorbidities, and to those with a BMI between 25 and 
30 with comorbidities. 
We consider a short-term effect of 5% on weight, based on the literature discussed 
above. Given the evidence on side-effects and duration of treatment, we stop the 
treatment after 2 years, and let weight evolve (back) to the trajectory predicted by the 
model. As a sensitivity check, we allow the pill to be 5% more effective (10% 
effectiveness in the short-run). There are 1.4 million individuals eligible in the current 
eligibility scenario and 2.4 million under the extended eligibility scenario.  
We use the microsimulation model to simulate the experience of the 2010 cohort of 
age 50 individuals under the status-quo and under each of the four scenarios above. We 
simulate 1000 times and compute the mean outcomes. We use a 3% real discount rate to 
compute present values from the age of 50. We define healthy life years as years lived 
without ADL limitations and compute other aggregates in 2010 dollars. 
 
C.2 Results 
In the current eligibility scenario, bariatric surgery reduces weight by 25% permanently 
among those with a BMI over 40 or a BMI between 35 and 40 with co-morbidities. Table 
1 gives the simulation results in terms of net present values per capita among the 
eligibles. Under the baseline, those eligible have a total life expectancy of 28.8 years at 
age 50, and a healthy life expectancy of 19.3 years. This implies that they may expect to 
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live close to 9.5 years with ADL limitations. Under the bariatric surgery intervention, 
they live on average 1.56 years longer and spend more than 2.9 additional years without 
ADL limitations. Hence, this implies that their unhealthy life expectancy is reduced by 
1.34 years. The present value of their total medical costs is reduced by $4,436. Most of 
this effect comes from a reduction in Medicare costs ($3,171). Because eligible patients 
live on average 1.56 years longer, the cost savings each year are somewhat muted by 
longer life-span. This effect is clear when we look at the implications for other 
government expenditures, most notably Social Security. There is an increase of $7,496 in 
spending for other programs following the intervention. Some of that is due to higher per-
period earnings, due to a positive effect of weight loss on labor force participation, 
retirement and wages. Although revenues also increase, the overall effect on other fiscal 
outcomes is negative (higher revenue is more than offset by larger increases in other 
spending). Combining medical costs and other fiscal outcomes, we reach the conclusion 
that the total economic effect is slightly adverse ($1869 - $7496 + $4436 =-$1191). 
Those results highlight the importance of taking into account effects not only on medical 
costs, but also on taxes and other fiscal spending.  
In the extended eligibility scenario, we extend treatment to those with a BMI of 
35 to 40 without co-morbidities, and those with a BMI of 30 to 35 with co-morbidities. 
Hence, the marginal patient suffers from a less severe form of obesity. Not surprisingly, 
the results show that the total life expectancy effect is now just 1.09 years, or 1/3 less 
than before.  Healthy life expectancy rises by 1.75 years, rather than 2.91. The treated 
population under extended eligibility is double that from the baseline scenario (the newly 
treated represent 53% of the new population). From the fraction treated, we can deduce 
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that the effect on life expectancy in the newly added group is 0.67 years while the effect 
on healthy life expectancy is 0.72 years. Hence, the marginal effect is smaller than in the 
current eligibility scenario, as expected. Because the life expectancy effect is smaller, 
there is less upward pressure on lifetime medical costs.  In terms of medical costs, the 
average effect is a $5802 reduction, which is larger than the $4436 reduction obtained 
under the current eligibility scenario. Based on these numbers, we can infer that cost 
savings are $7013 among the newly eligible, since this group is 53% of the “expanded 
eligibility” pool.  The overall cost-savings for the expanded pool is the weighted average 
of the newly and currently eligible cost-savings numbers.  Because the average life 
expectancy effect is lower, taxes and spending rise by less than in the current eligible 
scenario: taxes rise by $1067, and other spending by $4918.  Overall, net economic 
savings are $1,951. Under the “extended eligibility” scenario, the newly eligible enjoy 
savings of $4,737.  
There appears to be a trade-off between net savings and life expectancy gains. To 
compare the two, we first value those life expectancy gains using estimates Viscusi and 
Aldy (2003), who argue that the best available value of a statistical life-year is $200,000. 
In that case, the currently eligible patients enjoy a net value of $310,963 ($200,000 times 
life expectancy gain), while the newly eligible (under extended eligibility criteria) enjoy a 
net value of $222,827. At these values of a statistical life-year, the undiscounted life 
expectancy effect dominates the cost effect. The discounted life expectancy effect at a 3% 
discount rate yields a value of $141,709, well above the cost of the treatments. 
Another approach for evaluating welfare is the incremental cost-effectiveness 
ratio. We add the net economic savings (or costs) to the cost of the treatment and divide 
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by the change in life expectancy and healthy life expectancy. Table 2 shows those results. 
The incremental cost per life year gained is $13,577 among the currently eligible and 
$16,552 among the newly eligible. Assuming years spent unhealthy are worthless, these 
ratios (incremental cost per healthy life-year) drop to $7,282 among the currently eligible 
and 10,313 among those in extended eligibility scenario. The smaller ratio is due to the 
larger effects on healthy vs. total life expectancy found in Table 1. These are well within 
the range of ratios found for other interventions. For the newly eligible, cost effectiveness 
per life-year is somewhat larger at $19,189, while it is $13,000 per healthy life-year. 
Hence, overall, both these scenarios provide considerable value, and incremental cost-
effectiveness ratios are acceptable within the range of current interventions covered.  
We now turn to the evaluation of pharmacotherapy. As discussed in C.1.2, 
patients are eligible with BMI over 35, or BMI between 30 and 35 with co-morbidities. In 
the extended scenario, eligibility is conferred upon all patients with BMI of 30 to 35, and 
patients with BMI between 25 to 30 and co-morbidities. We consider a contemporanous 
weight reduction of 5%. We then let weight evolve from that initial baseline level; this 
imposes no restrictions on the evolution of weight, and supposes that treatment is 
manifested by a one-time weight reduction.  Because the BMI equation is dynamic and 
contains lags, the effect is carried for up to 5 years. Table 3 shows the results of the 
simulations. 
Compared to surgery, the effects on life expectancy and healthy life expectancy 
are very small. In the current eligibility scenario, total life expectancy improves by 
slightly more than 1 month while healthy life expectancy rises by 2 months. Effects are 
even smaller in the expanded eligibility scenario with both healthy life expectancy and 
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total life expectancy increasing by less than 2 weeks. There are some savings in medical 
costs, between $339 (current) and $460 (extended). Taxes go up by a small amount ($108 
and $42), while other fiscal expenditures go up by $356 in the currently eligible scenario 
and $166 in the extended eligibility scenario. Total savings are virtually zero ($89) in the 
currently eligible scenario and a mere $316 in the expanded eligibility scenario.  
The cost of a 2-year treatment is roughly $800. As shown in Table 4, the total 
economic effect, including treatment cost is $709 in the currently eligible scenario, but 
$464 under the extended eligibility scenario. Given the small increase in life expectancy, 
this implies incremental costs per life year of $8,201 for those currently eligible and 
$13,037 for those in the extended eligibility scenario. Hence, although the cost-
effectiveness ratios remain acceptable, the total health benefits from a two-year treatment 
are quite small. It is not so much the size of the effect that drives these estimates, but also 
the fact that treatment is not sustained over time, as a result of the side effects 
experienced.  
In Table 5, we consider 3 sensitivity analyses for bariatric surgery and 1 for 
pharmacotherapy. We show these for the currently eligible population only, as results are 
qualitatively similar for the newly eligible population. First, we consider variation in the 
effectiveness of bariatric surgery. We first consider that it now reduces weight by 35% 
compared to 25% in the results shown so far. This increases the life expectancy gain from 
1.56 to 1.77. Instead of generating net economic cost, we now obtain net savings, which 
lead to a cost-effectiveness ratio per life year of $10,967, rather than $13,577 under the 
baseline. The impact of the effectiveness parameter is non-linear, as we see in the next 
scenario, which lowers effectiveness by 10% (surgery reduces weight by 15%, rather than 
 18 
25%). The life expectancy gains are cut considerably from 1.56 years to just under one 
year. In that scenario, the incremental cost-effectiveness rises to $21,660 per life-year 
compared to $13,577 under the baseline effect.  This implies an increase in cost-
effectiveness of 59%. Finally, instead of permanent weight loss, we allow the eligible 
population to regain 50% of their weight loss after 10 years. This has an effect similar to 
lowering effectiveness by 10%. The incremental cost-effectiveness per life-year is 
estimated to be $19,533 under this scenario. Overall, these sensitivity analyses 
demonstrate that effectiveness matters for our results, but the implied cost-effectiveness 
ratios continue to hover around $20,000 per life-year. This remains low in comparison 
with the value of one additional life year, most of which is spent in good health.  
D. Long-Term Population Analysis 
The interventions considered tend to improve lifetime health outcomes for those treated, 
and these dominate the modest or even negative effects on their lifetime costs.  It remains 
to investigate the population-wide trend implications of these interventions.  This is 
analogous to an analysis of “period” effects, in contrast to the cohort effects studied in the 
earlier section.   
 Under the status quo, Ruhm (2007) has projected large increases in obesity among 
50 year-olds, with the largest increases coming for class 2 (BMI between 35 and 40) and 
class 3 obesity (BMI over 40). Hence, we take Ruhm’s projections up to 2030 and project 
them out to 2050. This represents the “do-nothing” scenario and leads to a prevalence of 
obesity of over 50% in 2050, where 15.4% of the population aged 50+ suffers from class 
3 obesity (BMI 40 and over).  Although this status-quo scenario may be arbitrarily 
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pessimistic, it represents a baseline for interventions that would start treating eligible 
members of new cohorts with surgery and pharmacotherapy.  
D.1 Scenarios 
We study aggregate trends under several alternative scenarios for obesity 
treatment.  First, the status quo scenario trends obesity among incoming cohorts 
according to Ruhm’s projections. Other projections are derived for other conditions 
following the methodology proposed by Goldman et al. (2004). In addition, the status quo 
scenario embeds the following assumptions: 
1. The size, and composition (racial and gender) of the entering 50 year-old 
cohort is based on Census projections.  
2. Exogenous mortality improvements of 0.88%, as in the Social Security Board 
of Trustees intermediate scenario. Social Security is more conservative than 
the Census in its mortality projection. We assess the sensitivity of our results 
to this assumption.  
3. Real wages rise by 1.1% per year over the long-term.  This also comes from 
the intermediate scenario of Social Security.  
4. Real medical costs rise in excess of earnings by 1.5% in 2004, but this rate 
declines linearly to 1% in 2033, 0.4% in 2053, and -0.2% in 2083.  This is 
similar to the assumptions made by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services.  
In sensitivity analyses, we vary assumptions 3 and 4.  We also consider how these 
results are affected by the introduction of cures for obesity-related conditions, which 
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would lower the marginal benefits of the treatments we consider. A more complete 
description of the population model is given in the technical appendix. 
The second set of scenarios we consider are the “current eligibility” scenarios, in 
which all patients eligible according to current guidelines are treated.  Specifically, we 
model interventions that apply bariatric surgery according to current guidelines, and 
separately consider interventions that apply pharmacotherapy according to current 
guidelines.  In addition, we also consider the joint effects of pharmacotherapy and 
bariatric surgery, since they can be implemented simultaneously.  If a patient is eligible 
for both treatments, she receives them both. 
Finally, we consider a set of “extended eligibility” scenarios, based on the 
extended guidelines for bariatric surgery and pharmacotherapy specified above. Once 
again, we model the separate application of bariatric surgery and pharmacotherapy, and 
then consider them jointly.   
D.2 Results 
In Table 6, we present the results of the status quo. As discussed in the online 
technical appendix, the model’s forecasts the age 65+ population to within 2 million of 
Social Security’s forecasts. It also predicts that, due to worsening health for incoming 
cohorts, future elderly cohorts will face greater prevalence of chronic conditions like 
diabetes and heart disease. Obesity is projected to afflict one in two Americans and the 
prevalence of class 3 obesity grows four-fold. The prevalence of diabetes is projected to 
double over the next 40 years. The size of the Medicare program would grow to $1.5 
trillion dollars in 2050.  
 21 
Table 7 presents results of the current eligibility scenario. Because of the higher 
life expectancy experienced by those treated, the aged 65+ population grows by 0.4 
million in 2030 and 1.44 million in 2050. Obesity falls by 14% relative to the status quo 
level of 55.5%, a decrease of 25%. Perhaps more importantly, class 3 obesity would be 
3.4% in 2050, lower than its 2004 level. A similar reduction would occur for class 2 
obesity. This implies that in 2030, total medical costs for the age 50+ population would 
decrease by $21.6 billion. The figure for 2050 would be $24.8 billion and would 
represent roughly 1% of medical costs in that year. More than half this decline would 
come from Medicare and Medicaid. Revenues would increase slightly due to higher life 
expectancy and the same would be true for Social Security benefits. As in the eligible 
population scenarios, the net effects are small because the increase in the annuity burden 
offsets the medical costs savings. In 2030, the medical cost savings outpace the longevity 
effect due to a timing effect:  per-period costs are lowered first, while life expectancy 
rises later. The estimated fiscal savings are $11.37 billion in 2030, but they disappear by 
2050.  
Next, we look at a scenario where we extend the population eligible for surgical 
and pharmaceutical intervention. The additional cases treated are now likely to be lower-
value.  The aggregate effects on population are larger, mostly because more people are 
treated. The extended scenario does not do much to further reduce the obesity rate, 
although there is some gain in terms of class 2 obesity, which falls by 10% instead of 7%. 
Total medical cost savings are $22.4 billion in 2030 and $32.2 billion in 2050; this is 
roughly 50% larger than in the current eligibility scenario. The net fiscal effect remains 
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positive ($18.9 billion in 2030 and $8.6 billion in 2050) and is substantially larger than in 
the current eligibility scenario.  
We perform sensitivity analyses on the current eligibility scenario. First, we 
increase the rate of growth in medical spending. Specifically, we assume cost growth will 
be 1.5% in 1992-2004, 1.5% in 2033, 0.9% in 2053, and 0.3% in 2083. The 3rd and 4th 
column of Table 9 give the results while the first two columns give the baseline results 
found in Table 7. Medical savings become larger, which slightly improves the net 
absolute fiscal effects. But the basic conclusion remains the same: net aggregate fiscal 
effects are small.  
In the next two columns, we assume real earnings growth of 1.7% annually 
instead of 1.1%; this flips the sign of the net fiscal effect, due primarily to a lower 
annuity burden. The fourth sensitivity analysis lowers the marginal health benefit from 
the intervention by “curing” diabetes for 50% of the incoming cohort.  The net fiscal 
effect falls as a result ($7.56 billion in 2030 and -$7.12 billion in 2050). The final 
sensitivity analysis adopts Census assumptions regarding mortality improvements. We 
calibrate these so as to reach a 65+ population of 87 million in 2050, rather than the 80 
million projected by SSA. This tends to yield larger medical cost savings relative to 
Social Security benefit increases. Hence, the net fiscal effect is larger than in the baseline. 
A constant through all these scenarios is that none of these rather “extreme” assumptions 
appears to affect the basic conclusion from the population analysis. Fiscal benefits are 
rather small in the aggregate whereas there is a substantial cut in the obesity rate in the 
population.  
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E. Discussion 
For cohorts suffering from obesity, bariatric surgery promises substantial gains in life 
expectancy.  50 year-olds eligible for surgery according to current guidelines can expect 
1.5 years of additional life and 2.9 years of additional healthy life.  These individuals can 
expect to incur modestly higher total costs, primarily due to non-health care expenditures 
by the federal government, but these are more than justified by the increase in life 
expectancy.  Formally, bariatric surgery is highly cost-effective, costing less than 
$20,000 per life-year saved.  This would continue to be true if the use of surgery were 
expanded past current eligibility guidelines, even though the absolute gains in health 
would be smaller for the marginally treated patients. 
 Pharmacotherapy is similarly cost-effective, but its absolute effect on health and 
life expectancy is much smaller and on the order of a few months.  Nonetheless, its lower 
cost is more than justified by the modest gains in life expectancy.  Taken together, 
however, the biggest gains in life expectancy are likely to come from bariatric surgery, 
rather than currently available pharmacotherapies. 
 The above results describe the value of these therapies to obese cohorts.  From a 
population-wide perspective, there are also benefits in terms of reduced obesity rates, and 
lower public spending.  From a societal perspective, per period medical costs fall almost 
immediately with the reduction in obesity, and increases in financial liability – from 
increased life expectancy -- take time to emerge.  As a result, society sees upfront cost-
reductions that erode slowly over time.   
 The net value of obesity-treatment balances morbidity-reduction, longevity gain 
and changes in spending.  Improvements in longevity generate private value, but also 
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impose greater financial liabilities on public annuity and medical insurance schemes.  
The arithmetic tends to favor obesity treatment, because: the value of longevity 
improvement is high; the costs of greater longevity are delayed; and the benefits of 
morbidity reduction accrue in the very short-term.  
 Our analysis quantifies the substantial value associated with the successful 
treatment of obesity using technologies available today.  A significant unknown is the 
direction of future innovation, which could yield even more effective treatments for 
obesity, but potentially at higher cost.  Modeling the likely course of future innovations to 
treat obesity is a natural next step.
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Bariatric Surgery Cohort Simulation Results 
 
 
Notes: averages from 100 simulations. Real discount rate is 3%. All amounts in $2010 dollars. SSI = 
Supplemental Security Income, DI = Disability insurance, OASI = old-age social insurance.  Please refer to 
text for definition of current and expanded eligibility.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Cost-Effectiveness: Bariatric Surgery 
 
Notes: averages from 100 simulations. Real discount rate is 3%. All dollar figures are in terms of 2010 
dollars. Fiscal effect is tax revenue net of Medicaid, Medicare, SSI, DI, and OASI expenditures. Total 
economic effect is fiscal effect plus other private medical spending. Treatment cost is assumed to be 
$20,000. Cost effectiveness ratio is the total economic effect (including treatment cost) divided by the gain 
in life or health life year from the intervention. 
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Table 3 Pharmacotherapy Cohort Simulation Results 
 
 
Notes: averages from 100 simulations. Real discount rate is 3%. All amounts are reported in 2010 dollars. 
SSI = Supplemental Security Income, DI = Disability insurance, OASI = old-age social insurance.  Please 
refer to text for definition of current and expanded eligibility.  
 
 
 
Table 4 Cost-Effectiveness: Pharmacotherapy 
  
Notes: averages from 100 simulations. Real discount rate is 3%. All dollar figures in $2010. Fiscal effect is 
tax revenue net of Medicaid, Medicare, SSI, DI, and OASI expenditures. Total economic effect is fiscal 
effect plus other private medical spending. Treatment cost is assumed to be $20,000. Cost effectiveness 
ratio is the total economic effect (including treatment cost) divided by the gain in life or health life year 
from the intervention. 
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Table 5 Sensitivity Analysis Cohort Simulations 
 
 
Notes: Table reports the average of 100 simulations. The real discount rate is 3%. Total net cost includes 
treatment costs. Bariatric surgery effectiveness is allowed to increase to 35% (line 2), and decrease to 15% 
(line 3). At line 4, we let patients receiving the surgery regain 50% of their weight after 10 years. We also 
allow the pharmacotherapy to be 5% more effective (10% effectiveness).  
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Table 6 Status Quo Population Estimates 2004-2050 
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Table 7 Current Eligibility Population Estimates 2004-2050  
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Table 8 Extended Eligibility Population Estimates 2004-2050 
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Table 9 Sensitivity Analysis Population Scenarios 
 
Notes: average of 100 simulations. The current eligibility population scenario is ran under 5 different set of assumptions and the resulting absolute effects relative 
to status-quo are presented. Refer to the text for details on each set of assumptions. All dollars in 2010 dollars). 
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F. Appendix:  Overview of the Future Elderly Model  
 
Figure F.1 gives an overview of the mechanics of the model. In this appendix, we 
focus on the key aspects of the model for this paper. Namely, we focus our attention on 
the key assumptions in the transition model and the health care cost model. A complete 
technical appendix containing details on the modeling is available online at the Schaeffer 
Center for Health Policy and Economics website (http://healthpolicy.usc.edu/, FEM  
Version 1.7). 
 
Figure F.1  
Overview of the Future Elderly Model 
 
We start in 2004 with an initial population aged 51+ taken from the HRS. We 
then predict outcomes using our estimated transition probabilities. Those who survive 
make it to the end of that year, at which point we calculate policy outcomes for the year. 
We then move to the following time period (two years later), when a new cohort of 51 
and 52 year-olds enters. This entrance forms the new age 51+ population, which then 
proceeds through the transition model as before. This process is repeated until we reach 
the final year of the simulation.  
F.1 Health Transition Model 
We consider a large set of outcomes for which we model transitions. We list these 
outcomes in the next table along, along with summary statistics.  
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Figure F.2 
Summary Statistics of Outcomes in the Transition Model 
 
 
 
Since we have a stock sample from the age 51+ population, each respondent goes 
through an individual-specific series of intervals. Hence, we have an unbalanced panel 
over the age range starting from 51 years old. Denote by   the first age at which 
respondent i is observed and  the last age when he is observed. Hence we observe 
outcomes at ages .  
We first start with discrete outcomes which are absorbing states (e.g. disease 
diagnostic, mortality, benefit claiming). Record as =1 if the individual outcome m 
has occurred as of age . We assume the individual-specific component of the hazard can 
be decomposed in a time invariant and variant part. The time invariant part is composed 
of the effect of observed characteristics  and permanent unobserved characteristics 
specific to outcome m, . The time-varying part is the effect of previously diagnosed 
outcomes , (outcomes other than the outcome m) on the hazard for m.2 We 
assume an index of the form . Hence, the latent component 
of the hazard is modeled as 
 . (1) 
                                                 
2 With some abuse of notation,  denotes the previous age at which the respondent was 
observed. 
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We approximate  with an age spline. After several specification checks, a 
node at age 75 appears to provide the best fit. This simplification is made for 
computational reasons since the joint estimation with unrestricted age fixed effects for 
each condition would imply a large number of parameters.   
The outcome, conditional on being at risk, is defined as 
 .  (2) 
As mentioned we consider 8 outcomes which are absorbing states. The occurrence 
of mortality censors observation of other outcomes in a current year. Mortality is 
recorded from exit interviews. 
First, we have binary outcomes which are not an absorbing state. We specify 
latent indices as in (1) for these outcomes as well but where the lag dependent outcome 
also appears as a right-hand side variable. This allows for state-dependence.  
Second, we have ordered outcomes. These outcomes are also modeled as in (1) 
recognizing the observation rule is a function of unknown thresholds . Similarly to 
binary outcomes, we allow for state-dependence by including the lagged outcome on the 
right-hand side. 
The third type of outcomes we consider are censored outcomes, earnings and 
financial wealth. Earnings are only observed when individuals work. For wealth, there is 
a non-negligible number of observations with zero and negative wealth. For these, we 
consider two part models where the latent variable is specified as in (1) but model 
probabilities only when censoring does not occur. In total, we have  outcomes. We 
also include a set of other controls including gender, race and education level. The 
estimation strategy is explained in the online technical appendix. 
F.2 Health Care Costs 
In the FEM, a cost module links a person’s current state—demographics, 
economic status, current health, risk factors, and functional status—to 4 types of 
individual medical spending. The FEM models: total medical spending (medical 
spending from all payment sources), Medicare spending3, Medicaid spending (medical 
spending paid by Medicaid), and out of pocket spending (medical spending by the 
respondent). These estimates are based on pooled weighted least squares regressions of 
each type of spending on risk factors, self-reported conditions, and functional status, with 
spending inflated to constant dollars using the medical component of the consumer price 
index.  We use the 2002-2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (n = 14,098) for these 
regressions for persons not Medicare eligible, and the 2002-2004 Medicare Current 
Beneficiary Survey (n = 33, 231) for spending for those that are eligible for Medicare. 
Those eligible for Medicare include persons eligible due to age (65+) or due to disability 
status. 
                                                 
3 We estimate annual medical spending paid by Medicare either in total, or for a specific part of 
Medicare (Parts A, B, and D) 
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In the baseline scenario, this spending estimate can be interpreted as the resources 
consumed by the individual given the manner in which medicine is practiced in the 
United States at the beginning of the 21st century. Since Medicare spending has 
numerous components (Parts A and B are considered here), models are needed to predict 
enrollment. In 2004, 98.4% of all Medicare enrollees, and 99%+ of aged enrollees, were 
in Medicare Part A, and thus we assume that all persons eligible for Medicare take Part 
A. We use the 1999-2004 MCBS to model take up of Medicare Part B for both new 
enrollees into Medicare, as well as current enrollees without Part B. Estimates are based 
on weighted probit regression on various risk factors, demographic, and economic 
conditions. The HRS starting population for the FEM does not contain information on 
Medicare enrollment. Therefore another model of Part B enrollment for all persons 
eligible for Medicare is estimated via a probit, and used in the first year of simulation to 
assign initial Part B enrollment status. The MCBS data over represents the portion 
enrolled in Part B, having a 97% enrollment rate in 2004 instead of the 93.5% rate given 
by Medicare Trustee’s Report. 
Since both the MEPS and MCBS are known to under-predict medical spending, 
we applied adjustment factors to the predicted three types of individual medical spending 
so that in year 2004, the predicted per-capita spending in FEM equal the corresponding 
spending in National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA), for age group 55-64 and 65 
and over, respectively.  For example, the predicted per-capita total medical spending for 
aged 65 and over in FEM 2004 is $13,920, while the corresponding number in NHEA is 
$14,797. The adjustment factor is calculated as $14,797 divided by $13,920, which is 
1.06.  Therefore the total medical spending for each aged 65 and over in FEM will be 
multiplied by 1.06.   
The Medicare Current Beneficiaries Survey (MCBS) 2006 contains data on 
Medicare Part D. The data gives the capitated Part D payment and enrollment. When 
compared to the summary data presented in the CMS 2007 Trustee Report, the per capita 
cost is comparable between the MCBS and the CMS. However, the enrollment is 
underestimated in the MCBS, 53% compared to 64.6% according to CMS. To account for 
both the initial under reporting of Part D enrollment in the MCBS, as well as the CMS 
prediction that Part D enrollment will rise to 75% by 2012, the constant in the probit 
model is increased by 0.22 in 2006, to 0.56 in 2012 and beyond.  The per capita Part D 
cost in the MCBS matches well with the cost reported from CMS. An OLS regression 
using demographic, current health, and functional status is estimated for Part D costs. 
F.3 Revenues and Other Expenditures 
We consider Federal, State and City taxes paid at the household level. We also 
calculate Social Security taxes and Medicare taxes. HRS respondents are linked to their 
spouse in the HRS simulation. We take program rules from the OECD’s Taxing Wages 
Publication for 2004. Households have basic and personal deductions based on marital 
status and age (>65). Couples are assumed to file jointly. Social Security benefits are 
partially taxed. The amount taxable increases with other income from 50% to 85%. Low 
income elderly have access to a special tax credit and the earned income tax credit is 
applied for individuals younger than 65. We calculate state and city taxes for someone 
living in Detroit, Michigan. The OECD chose this location because it is generally 
representative of average state and city taxes paid in the U.S. Since Social Security 
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administrative data cannot be used jointly with Geocoded information in the HRS, we 
apply these hypothetical taxes to all respondents. 
Workers with 40 quarters of coverage and of age 62 are eligible to receive their 
retirement benefit. The benefit is calculated based on the Average Indexed Monthly 
Earnings (AIME) and the age at which benefits are first received. If an individual claims 
at his normal retirement age (NRA) (65 for those born prior to 1943, 66 for those 
between 1943 and 1957, and 67 thereafter), he receives his Primary Insurance Amount 
(PIA) as a monthly benefit. The PIA is a piece-wise linear function of the AIME. If a 
worker claims prior to his NRA, his benefit is lower than his PIA. If he retires after the 
NRA, his benefit is higher. While receiving benefits, earnings are taxed above a certain 
earning disregard level prior to the NRA. An individual is eligible to half of his spouse’s 
PIA, properly adjusted for the claiming age, if that is higher than his/her own retirement 
benefit. A surviving spouse is eligible to the deceased spouse’s PIA. Since we assume 
prices are constant in our simulations, we do not adjust benefits for the COLA (Cost of 
Living Adjustment) which usually follows inflation. We however adjust the PIA 
bendpoints for increases in real wages.  
Workers with enough quarters of coverage and under the normal retirement age 
are eligible for their PIA (no reduction factor) if they are judged disabled (which we take 
as the predicted outcome of DI receipt) and earnings are under a cap called the 
Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) limit. This limit was $9720 in 2004. We ignore the 9 
month trial period over a 5 year window in which the SGA is ignored. 
Self reported receipt of supplemental security income (SSI) in the HRS provides 
estimates of the proportion of people receiving SSI under what administrative data would 
suggest. To correct for this bias, we link the HRS with administrative data from the social 
security administration identifying those receiving SSI. In the linked administrative data, 
3.96% of the population receives supplementary security income, while only 2.79% of 
the sample reports social security income. We therefore estimate a probit of receiving SSI 
as a function of self-reporting social security income, as well as demographic, health, and 
wealth. The benefit amount is taken from the average monthly benefits found in the 2004 
Social Security Annual Statistical Supplement. We assign monthly benefit of $450 for 
person aged 51 to 64, and $350 for persons aged 65 and older. 
 
F.4 Trend Assumptions 
The baseline model uses the SSA intermediate growth assumptions. We test the 
sensitivity of our model by using the SSA high and low growth assumptions. As would 
be anticipated, this has little effect on our predictions of medical expenditures in 2050, 
but has effects on future OASI/DI expenditures, as well as on tax revenues. Under the 
SSA low growth assumptions we find a reduction in OASI expenditures of $234.6 billion 
and also a reduction in tax revenues of $66 billion. The SSA high growth assumptions 
provide the opposite result that tax revenues go up by about $78 billion, and that OASI 
expenditures increase by $280 billion.  
The baseline model also uses the SSA assumptions on mortality improvements, 
but the Census bureau uses alternative assumptions which result in greater mortality 
improvements over time. We thus test the sensitivity of our model by using the Census 
mortality assumptions. As would be expected, this increases the aged population in 2050 
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and thus both the population medical expenditures (by $303 billion) and OASI payments 
($139 billion).  
The other long term economic trend assumed in the model is that of real medical 
cost growth. To assess the effect of this assumption, we alternatively assume a higher 
medical cost growth (1.5% in 2033, .9% in 2053 linearly interpolated as compared with 
1% in 2033 and 0.4% in 2053 in the baseline). This assumption has only moderate effects 
on social security expenditures, but increase medical expenditures by $586 Billion in 
2050 for the aged population. 
 
 
